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RECENT DECISIONS
commission of the fraud. As previously noted, the general practice is to
allow punative damages where the defendant has assumed no risk in
perpetrating the fraud.'
As a further inducement to the perpetration of fraud, the possibility of
gain is provided. Practically speaking, the defrauded party may find the
cost of bringing suit prohibitive. On the other hand, an insurance company
generally retains a permenant legal staff and can well afford the cost of
defending those suits which are prosecuted. As a consequence, many victims
of fraud will not prosecute, thus permitting the wrongdoer to profit without
the necessity of successfully defending a suit. It is submitted that, where
punative damages are a probable risk to a party, it might be found econom-
ically impractical to engaged in fraudulent activities. In order to circumvent
the above problems, it seems that the plaintiff should properly have been al-
lowed to proceed in tort and punative damages should have been allowed.
For the foregoing reasons, it is urged upon the court that it reconsider
the position taken in this case.
MYRON E. PITCH
CONTRACT CLAUSE PROVIDING FOR ARBITRATION OF FUTURE DISPUTES
Is NOT ENFORCEABLE IN MONTANA.-Plaintiff entered into an agreement
with defendant whereby plaintiff agreed to lease land from defendant and
run steers on it for a period of four years. Defendant was -to supply 600
steers per year and at the end of each year, the steers were to be sold and the
proceeds divided. This was done without incident for two years, but during
the third year, defendant placed on the land 120 heifers in addition to the
steers. A dispute arose over whether the heifers were to be handled under
the terms of the agreement. Finally defendant sold both the heifers and the
steers without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff and appropriated
the proceeds. Plaintiff remained on the land until the termination of the
lease but no more cattle were run under the agreement. After some futile
discussion between the parties, plaintiff instituted this suit for his share
of the disputed proceeds and the profit he would have made had they con-
tinued as the contract stipulated. One of the defenses asserted related to
paragraph six of the contract which reads: "Any difference between the
parties under this lease that cannot be settled after thorough discussion,
shall be submitted for arbitration by a committee of three disinterested
persons, one selected by each party here to and the third by the two thus
selected, and their decision shall be accepted by both parties." Defendant
contended that plaintiff had refused to arbitrate and was thus barred from
proceeding with the suit. The court ruled against defendant on all counts
and judgment was entered for the plaintiff. On appeal to the Montana
Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The rights of parties to free access to the
courts cannot be interfered with and any such interference is void as viola-
151 Cal, App. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534, 538 (1959).
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tive of the Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, section 13-806.1 Green v. Wolfe,
372 P.2d 427 (Mont. 1962).
This statute provides: "Every stipulation or condition in a contract
by which any party thereto is restricted from enforcing his rights under the
contract, by the usual proceedings in the ordinary -tribunals, or which
limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is void." The
statute is an enactment of the common law as it existed in 1895.' The com-
mon law dealing with arbitration clauses is predicated essentially on
grounds of public policy' which have undergone substantial change in the
intervening period." Consequently this article will deal with an examin-
ation of: (1) the common law as it existed in 1895, (2) the changes that
have occured since that time, (3) the rationale behind those changes, and
(4) the resulting need for new legislation.
The common law generally recognized four distinct types of arbitration
clauses. They are: (1) agreements to arbitrate disputes existing at the
time the agreement is entered into. These were held valid and enforceable
at common law only after actually being arbitrated.' (2) Agreements which
make arbitration of disputes not in existence at the time the agreement is
consumated a condition precedent to court litigation. (3) Agreements
which limit the scope of arbitration of future disputes to specified factual
areas,' and (4) clauses, such as found in the instant case, which make every
possible future dispute, factual or legal, the subject of arbitration and
such arbitration is final. Clauses of this latter type, which are the subject
of this article, were held unenforceable at common law.'
Apparently the problem first came to the attention of the English
courts during a period when judges were dependent on a fixed fee per
case as their means of livelihood.! Consequently, as every case arbitrated
deprived some judge of a fee he otherwise would have collected, judges
looked with disfavor on this attempt to deprive them of their income.'
From this early judicial antagonism arose the doctrine that arbitration
clauses were void as against public policy." This was buttressed by the
1Hereinafter REVISED COpES OF MONTANA will be cited at R.C.M.
'Wortman v. Montana Cent. Ry., 22 Mont. 266, 278, 56 Pac. 316, 321 (1899).0Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Eickhoff, 63 Minn. 170, 65 N.W. 351 (1895) ; Vynior's Case,
4 Coke, Part VIII, 81b, 82a (1610).
'Notes 34 and 35 infra.5Vynior's Case, supra note 3. All states with the exception of South Dakota and
Oklahoma specifically provide for such arbitration by what are called submission
statutes. Montana's submission statute is R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2011.
'Prior to 1855, these clauses were not valid at common law. In that year, Scott
v. Avery, 5 H.L. Cas. 811, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1855) held this type of agreement
valid. However, the case was almost immediately reversed so that the general
common law holding was that such agreements were invalid. The same result was
reached in this country in W.H. Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., 190 Cal. App. 665, 214
Pac. 38 (1926).
'These clauses, sometimes called appraisment agreements, are generally considered
valid and enforceable. In re Lower Baraboo River Drainage Dist., 199 Wis. 230,
225 N.W. 331 (1929).
Thompson v. Charnock, 8 T.R. 139, 101 Eng. Rep. 1310 (1799).
*Lord Campbell made this statement in discussing the unworthy beginnings of the
rule, and used it as justification for its reversal. Scott v. Avery, supra note 6.
"'Ibid.
"This is Lord Campbell's final conclusion concerning the rule he was about to
overrule. Scott v. Avery, supra note 6.
[Vol. 24,
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rationale that courts should not be ousted of their jurisdiction, nor parties
to a contract deprived of their right of access to the courts.' The rule
holding invalid clauses calling for arbitration of future disputes became
well established at common law and was early brought to this country where
it again found fertile soil." By 1895, it is doubtful that a single jurisdiction
had held to the contrary." Perhaps the best summation of the rule was
given by Justice Hunt who said:'
Every citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the
country, and to invoke the protection which all the laws of all
those courts may afford him. A man may not barter away his life
or his freedom or his substantial rights.... He cannot bind him-
self in advance by an agreement which may be specifically en-
forced, whenever the case may be presented.
Soon after the turn of the century, courts began to question the con-
cepts on which the common law concerning arbitration clauses was based.'
There were a variety of reasons responsible. Among these was the enact-
ment of submission statutes which allowed arbitration of existing disputes.'
The Minnesota court reasoned that the passage of such statutes signaled an
end to the public policy against arbitration of any kind.' If the parties
could agree to be bound by the results of an arbiter's" decision as to ex-
isting disputes, it did not seem to be violative of any public policy to al-
low them to be bound as to a future dispute.' Further, an arbiter's decision
is not self-enforcing, but requires a court order declaring it to be a judg-
ment of the court before it can be enforced against the adverse party.'
"Myers v. Jenkins, 63 Ohio St. 101, 57 N.E. 1089 (1900).
"aTobey v. County of Bristol, 23 Fed. Cas. 1313, (No. 14065) (County Ct. of Mass.
1845).
"At least this writer's research has not discovered any. However, in Perkins v.
United States Elec. Light Co., 16 Fed. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1881), the court enforced
an arbitration clause when it was a condition precedent.
"Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874). The court held that
parties to a contract could not agree to try any dispute arising out of the contract
in the state courts Instead of Federal courts.
'6Zindorf Constr. Co. v. Western Am. Co., 27 Wash. 31, 67 Pac. 374 (1901) (2 judges
dissenting). Prior to this decision, Washington had held that failure to arbitrate
an exi8ting dispute was a bar to court action. Here they extend the doctrine to
include future dLsputes. United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum
Co., 222 Fed. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). Judge Hough reluctantly upheld the common
law, feeling bound by earlier decisions of higher courts.
"Park Constr. Co. v. Independent School Dist., 209 Minn. 403, 296 N.W. 475 (1941)
(2 judges dissenting). This case overruled several earlier Minnesota cases, reason-
ing that the passage of the Minnesota submission statute in 1939 showed that the
public policy of Minnesota favored arbitration of aU disputes.
"Ibid.
"The distinction between arbiter and arbitrator is no longer adhered to. Russ. ARB.
112.
'Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean and Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 409, 232 Pac. 680 (1925);
Park Constr. Co. v. Independent School Dist., supra note 17. However, these courts
were not faced with the problem of a statutory statement of public policy such
as exists in Montana.
"In Montana, this is accomplished under the provisions of R.C.M. 1947, § 93-201-6
by filing the submission with the clerk of court in the county where one of the
parties resides. After five days and a showing that both parties have received
notice of the filing, the'award must be entered in the judgment book unless one
of the parties has asked for a stay of judgment to allow the court to review thejudgment. After judgment has been entered, it has the force of any other court
judgment.
19621
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This permits the courts to judicially review the arbitrator's decision."
Under this rationale, the argument has been advanced that the court is not
ousted of its jurisdiction.' Other courts have taken the position that
arbitration clauses do not affect the court's jurisdiction, thus making the
question of ouster unnecessary. To support this conclusion, courts have
stated that arbitration clauses simply remove a controversy from the
arena of litigation and are threfore in the same category as an out of
court settlement or a covenant not to sue.2' Further since the courts will
enforce both an agreement to arbitrate an existing dispute and any arbiter's
decision voluntarily submitted to, even if arising out of a future dispute,
some courts have thought it illogical to void an agreement to submit a
future dispute to arbitration since in each instance the dispute is re-
moved from the jurisdiction of the courts.' These various arguments are
well summed up by Chief Justice Leslie, speaking for the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals."
Formerly, no doubt, courts looked with jealously upon arbitra-
tions generally, and seemed to regard them as means or efforts to
oust the courts of jurisdiction in matters of litigation. Such is not
the attitude of courts at present. It is the view now that the 'more
intelligent' judicial sentiment is strongly in favor of arbitration.
It is said to be favored for the reason that it is speedier, less ex-
pensive, and a more amicable way, than is offered by litigation, for
the settlement of differences.
Finally some courts have thought it anomalous to state that such clauses
are invalid' but still legal.' This means that although a party can violate
the clause and bring his grievance to court, the opposing litigant can sue
for damages for the breach of the arbitration clause. Courts are generally
agreed, however, that the only measure of damages would be the difference
'As to the factor determinative of whether the award will be set aside, see Alliance
Constr. Co. v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 730 (1934) ; In the Matter of Arbitration
between Exercycle Corp. and James Maratta, 9 N.Y.S.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463
(1961).
"Of course, if this is followed too strictly, the primary purpose of arbitration is
somewhat emasculated. People usually arbitrate as a cheaper and easier method
of adjudicating disputes. If the courts regularly overturn the arbiter's decision
simply because they would have reached a different conclusion, the parties are
forced to use the courts and there is more expense and greater delay. If, on the
other hand, the courts automatically uphold the arbiter's decision, then to say that
the courts are not ousted of jurisdiction because they can review the arbiter's
decision is to tread a precarious semantical line. For an excellent discussion of
this problem, see Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude,
45 CORNTEL L.Q. 519 (1960).
2Park Constr. Co. v. Independent School Dist., supra note 17. Both out of court
settlements and covenants not to sue are common methods of settling disputes. The
argument, however, would seem to lose some of its vitality when it is remembered
that agreements to submit existing disputes to arbitration are universally held
valid and the examples mentioned by the Minnesota court likewise refer to existing
disputes. Thus to sustain the argument, it would seem that the court must show
some connection between existing and future disputes.5Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A, v. Amtorg Trading Corp. 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir.
1942).
-Ferguson v. Ferguson, 110 S.W.2d 1016, 1021 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
='In most instances, the words "invalid" and "unenforceable" are used synonymously.
However, the courts usually seem to mean unenforceable.
United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., supra note 16.
[Vol.'24,
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between the judgment of the court and what the arbiter would have given."
But since generally there has been no arbitration, this measure of damages
is impossible to apply. Thus only nominal damages are given and the
non-breaching party is left with a right violated for which there is no
remedy.
For these reasons the common law regarding arbitration has been found
to be unsatisfactory. Some have thought that the courts are not ousted
of jurisdiction by a clause sending to arbitration all future disputes; others
reason that even if there is an ouster, "it is surely a singular view of
judicial sanctity which reasons, that, because the Legislature has made a
court, therefor everybody must go to court."' Thus judicial attitude has
slowly shifted over the years to a position less antagonistic toward arbi-
tration. In 1920, New York adopted an act' stating that all agreements to
arbitrate future disputes were valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.' Congress
soon followed' as did many of the states." A combination of statutory enact-
ments and judicial decisions' shows that at least 20 of the states have
reversed the common law and hold that agreements to arbitrate future
disputes are enforceable and a good defense to an action brought by a
party refusing arbitration.
The Montana court first considered a contract containing an arbitration
clause in 1891.' There, the court held that such a clause would not operate
to bar a party from proceeding in court if he did not arbitrate. This, as
shown earlier, was the general common law ruling. While other juris-
dictions have abrogated the common law antagonism toward arbitration of
future disputes, the codification of the common law in 1895' has produced
the opposite result in Montana. In Cotter v. Grand Lodge A.O.U.W.," the
court found the statute inapplicable because the contract was signed be-
fore its passage and held that since the clause provided for arbitration as
a condition precedent to court action, it was valid and enforceable, at
29Munson v. Straits of Dover S.S. Co., 102 Fed. 926 (2d Cir. 1900) ; Electrical Re-
search Prod. v. Vitaphone Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 4017, 171 Atl. 738 (1943).
'United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. 1006,
1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
"Laws of New York, 143d session, vol 2, ch. 275 at 803 (1920).
'The common law was not codified in New York. Only Montana, Missouri, and
South Dakota codified the common law in this respect.
'9 U.S.C. § 2 (1952) (enacted first in 1925).
"Ariz. Rev. Stat. ch. 12, § 1509 (1956); Cal. Code of Civ. Pro., § 1280 (West 1955);
Gen. Stat, Conn. ch. 52, § 408 (1958); Rev. Laws of Hawaii ch 116, § 4170 (1935);
Rev. Stat. of La. ch. 9, § 4201 (1950) ; Ann. Laws of Mass. ch. 251, § 14 (1956);
Comp. Laws of Mich. § 645.1 (1948) ; Minn. Stat. 572.08 (1957) ; N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. 542.1 (1955) ; N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:24-1 (1952) ; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 274.101
(1953) ; Or. Rev. Stat. ch. 33, § 220 t1961) ; Penn. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 21 (1930);
Gen. Laws of R.I. ch. 10, § 3-2 (1957) ; Wis. Stat. ch. 298, § 01 (1961).
"5Zindorf Constr. Co. v. Western Am. Co., 27 Wash. 31, 67 Pac. 374 (1901) ; United
Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices v. Stine, 76 Nev. 189, 351 P.2d 965 (1960);
Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean and Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 409, 232 Pac. 680 (1925);
Ferguson v. Ferguson, supra note 26. This list does not include those states that
first overruled the common law by judicial action and then codified the court's de-
cision.
wRandall v. American Fire Ins. Co., 10 Mont. 340, 25 Pac. 953 (1891).
'R.C.M. 1947, § 13-806.
"23 Mont. 82, 57 Pac. 650 (1899).
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least insofar as it concerned a voluntary mutual benefit society.' Judge
Piggot had this to say about the rule in general:'
The common-law doctrine that a provision in an ordinary
contract requiring all differences between the parties touching
their rights and liabilities thereunder to be submitted to arbiters,
whose decision or award shall be conclusive and final, will not
be allowed to bar the litigation of such differences in the courts
of the land, is an anomaly, and inconsistent with the right freely
to contract; and, if it were not so firmly and well-nigh universally
established, we apprehend that it would be over-turned, as resting
upon no solid foundation of reason. Its operation should not be
extended by construction, nor should it ever be invoked to nullify
or impair contractual provisions not clearly infected with the sup-
posed evils intended to be cured or prevented.
Such a modern view however, could not last under the statute. In
Wortman v. Mont. Cent. Ry.," also decided in 1899, the court held the
statute applicable in a situation where an engineer was to be the sole
arbiter of any dispute over the construction of the contract or performance
under it. In 1936,' the Montana court faced an identical problem as that
faced in the Cotter case," holding that a clause making arbitration a con-
dition precedent to litigation violated the statute." And finally, in the
instant case, ' the court held that an arbitration clause embracing all
future disputes violated the statute.
The Montana court, however, has judiciously restricted the use of
the statute, holding at various times that the statute does not apply where:
(1) issues of ultimate liability are not concerned," (2) the clause limits
arbitration to a specific area," or (3) arbitration has actually been entered
into." The court has stated :'
It is the policy of the law to favor the settlement of disputes
by arbitration and every reasonable intendment will be indulged
to give effect to such proceedings. The decision by arbitration is the
decision of a tribunal of the parties' own choice and election. It
is a popular, cheap, convenient and domestic mode of trial, which
the courts have always regarded with liberal indulgence.
It becomes clear then, that whenever the arbitration clause embraces
the sum total of future disputes that can arise out of the contract, it is
S9upra note 38. Because of the personal nature of such societies, the courts have
often recognized this exception and held that arbitration clauses In their by-laws
are not void as against public policy.
'Supra note 38 at 89, 57 Pac. at 652.
"22 Mont. 266, 56 Pac. 316 (1899).
"Cacic v. Slovenska Narodna Podporna Jednota, 102 Mont. 438, 59 P.2d 910 (1936).
"Supra note 38.
"Supra note 42.
"Instant case at 433.
'Polley's Lbr. Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 751 (9th Or. 1949).
"Clifton-Applegate-Toole v. Drainage Dist. No. 1, 82 Mont. 322, 267 Pac. 207 (1928).
"Lee v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 82 Mont. 264, 266 Pac. 640 (1928).
"This statement first appears in Lee v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., supra note 48 at
273, 266 Pac. at 643. It is quoted in Clifton-Applegate-Toole v. Drainage Dist. No. 1,
supra note 47 at 329, 267 Pac. at 212, and was reiterated as recently as 1940 in
Polley's Lbr. Co. v. United States, supra note 46 at 754.
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necessary that R.C.M., 1947, section 13-806 be applied and the clause is not
enforceable. It is equally clear that the courts favor arbitration. Thus by
virtue of the statute, Montana finds itself clinging to a doctrine long
since removed from the mainstream of legal thinking and pushed into the
eddies and backwash of legal anachronisms. The legislature passed what
appeared, in 1895, to be a suitable law. In retrospect, however, it seems
that Montana codified what has come to be a poorly reasoned and heavily
criticized common law policy. The Montana court finds itself in somewhat
the same situation as did District Judge Hough in 1915, when he con-
sidered a motion to enforce an arbitration clause. He stated,' "Inferior
courts may fail to find convincing reasons for it; but the rule must be
obeyed and these motions be severally denied." It is submitted that the
Montana statute reflects an antiquated and repudiated public policy. A
rule is valid only so long as its underlying fundaments are sound. When
the erosions of time have dissipated these foundaments, the rule itself
must fall. The Montana Legislature should repeal this statute.
GORHAM SWANBERG
hUnited States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. 1006
(S.D.N.Y. 1915).
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